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Digital Platforms impose organizing logics on 
ecosystems. Dependent on their configuration, they 
enable certain practices, relationships, and value 
distribution among actors while preventing 
alternatives. Incumbent platforms often have a strong 
power to implement contested configurations since 
they control access to attractive user groups/markets. 
However, emerging platforms have a small degree of 
bargaining power in relation to key actors since they 
have not yet achieved such a position. Although 
numerous studies detail governance strategies for 
incumbent platform ecosystems, research on how 
platform providers navigate competing concerns in 
emerging platform ecosystems remain rare. We report 
on a study of the establishment and continuous 
dynamics of a digital platform used for service 
innovation. We inductively identify a pattern of the 
dynamics in this navigation process, locate four salient 
tensions driving these dynamics, and provide insights 
on how the platform provider navigated them.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Digital platforms, i.e. the “software-based products 
or services that serves as a foundation upon which 
outside parties can build complementary products or 
services” [1:5] provide organizations great 
opportunities for value creation. However, we are only 
starting to grasp the processes through which digital 
platforms emerge and establish a significant user base 
[2]. The literature on platform governance has largely 
focused on strategies to stimulate the development of 
services, coordinate and monetize the activities of 
distributed and heterogeneous actors participating in 
established digital platform ecosystems [3-6]. A salient 
theme in this body of research is the tensions resulting 
from the interactions of competing actors and platform 
owners in relation to different concerns. Examples 
include tensions related to identity [7], standard-
variety, control-autonomy and collective-individual 
[4]. For the provider, a key strength of the platform as 
an organizing logic is the ability to unite and 
coordinate agents in the ecosystem towards its strategic 
goals [8]. These agents may have distinct 
understandings of the current situation, conflicting 
goals, and incompatible ideas of how to advance the 
ecosystem, which we here refer to as competing 
concerns. Most studies examining platform governance 
strategies and the effects on the wider ecosystem have 
tended to focus on how platform providers address 
competing concerns in established platform ecosystems 
[6, 9]. Thus, extant research details the strategies of 
incumbents such as Apple, Google, or Intel in 
leveraging their market position and strategic control 
over key resources to influence an ecosystem. Such 
studies build on the premise that, as an owner of a 
central enabling bottleneck, the platform owner’s 
power and bargaining position often greatly exceeds 
that of independent suppliers of complementary 
components [10]. Platform owners will often have 
“bouncer’s rights” [11] to grant or deny access to the 
system and stipulate conditions associated with 
admittance. These empirical settings have provided 
insights into governance of third-party developers in 
platform ecosystems and choices regarding a 
platform’s economic scope and scale [10].  
However, establishing an ecosystem is significantly 
different from reinforcing an incumbent ecosystem. 
Unlike an incumbent platform ecosystem with a 
relatively stable value proposition and user base, an 
emerging platform’s value can be uncertain and 
obscured since it is often tightly connected to the user 
base and interactions in the ecosystem. Emerging 
platforms, with unstable user bases, will often have 
relatively small bargaining power or strategic control. 
i.e. the influence exerted on other members [12] since 
the value of the “bouncer’s rights” is dependent on the 
size and attractiveness of the entire ecosystem. 
Although incumbent digital platforms do not retain full 
control over design decisions [5], emergent platforms 
are likely to meet distinct challenges when enforcing 
change and managing competing concerns. The 







emphasis on mature and industry-leading platform 
ecosystems has led to a lack of knowledge of the 
processes and mechanisms through which platform 
providers deal with competing concerns during 
platform establishment. An increased understanding of 
governance dynamics in emerging platform ecosystems 
can help provide insights into the design of digital 
platforms [2]. Against this backdrop, this research 
explores how competing concerns shape the trajectory 
of nascent digital platform ecosystems. 
To this end, we report on a case study of a 
platform, Trafiklab, an initiative aimed at fostering an 
ecosystem of data providers and developers engage in 
developing digital services based on public transport 
data. Our analysis reveals multiple cycles of recurrent 
challenges to the status quo and associated responses. 
We provide a process model of the dynamics of 
platform establishment where new sociotechnical 
configurations arise from, and give rise to, tensions 
related to competing concerns. We provide insights 
into the emergent nature of this process. 
 
2. Digital Platform Establishment  
 
Digital platforms provide infrastructures for 
interactions between disparate groups, enable re-use of 
core components that provide functionality for 
peripheral modules, and coordinate the associated 
ecosystem through sociotechnical resources such as 
pricing, rules and boundary resources [3, 5, 13, 14]. 
Since they impose organizing logics, platforms can 
broadly be understood as meta-organizations that 
coordinate agents in a wider system [8]. The design of 
sociotechnical resources is the main vehicle through 
which a platform provider influences its ecosystem i.e. 
third-party applications and complementors 
participating to create value based on a platform’s 
interfaces [1]. Through the design of technological and 
social resources, a platform provider can specify 
decision rights, control how the platform is used to 
create services, and structure incentives to encourage 
or discourage certain actions by users in the ecosystem 
[1].  
A platform’s life cycle consists of three phases: (1) 
emergence of an ideal solution, (2) progression along a 
technology maturity curve, and (3) its uptake by group 
of prospective end-users [1]. Although the emergence 
phase is inherently fragile and can define the fate of a 
platform, few studies explore platform strategies and 
their dynamics in this phase. Strategy-oriented 
literature on platforms generally high-light pricing 
policies, such as subsidies and premium fees, to kick-
start, or “ignite”, a platform [14, 15]. By subsidizing 
prospective users, a new platform entrant can draw on 
initial users to attract others [15]. This perspective 
builds on the premise that once the platform “ignites” 
by attaining a critical mass of users, it becomes self-
sustaining [16]. Literature has also explored non-
pricing incentives such as timely notifications of 
changes affecting modules (e.g.- apps) as essential in 
attracting users and increasing the quality of external 
applications [17]. Developers may multi-home across 
multiple platforms, the capability to search for ways to 
distribute and monetize services in the ecosystem is an 
essential aspect in enriching a platform’s innovation 
habitat [18]. Degrees of openness and control is 
another widely acknowledged design consideration 
whereby deliberatively and progressively relinquishing 
control, a platform owner allows external actors to 
build complementary components that extend the 
platform ecosystem [10]. Labelled as coring, a set of 
technological and business functions entrants need to 
grow an ecosystem has been suggested [19]. Examples 
of these functions include ensuring that the platform 
serves a relevant function for an industry, ensuring 
dependence between components and protecting its 
core source of revenue [19]. Although the notion of 
coring includes a high-level description of what 
functionality new platform providers need to offer, 
how such functions are operationalized when 
establishing digital platforms has received limited 
attention. 
 
2.1. Competing Concerns and Digital Platform 
Ecosystem Governance  
 
Establishing a new platform involves reconfiguring 
organizing logics and relationships across multiple 
organizations and actors in an ecosystem. A new 
platform carries distinct structures for how to arrange 
and conduct exchanges as technical elements are 
coupled and new types of interactions among agents 
are facilitated. As such, it brings together multiple, 
distributed actors with different perspectives that need 
to be reconciled for the platform to become an 
accepted de facto standard. The structural 
configuration of digital platforms is, however, not 
static. Rather, it is subject to recurrent challenges from 
the distributed set of actors in the wider system of use 
[5, 20]. This is partly due to the malleability of digital 
technology that “exhibits a procrastinated binding of 
form and function [21] meaning that new capabilities 
can be added after a product or tool has been designed 
and produced” [22:1399]. Thus, the existing 
arrangement of resources and power within ecosystems 
continues to evolve throughout the lifetime of a digital 
platform, leading to disputed designs, unintended 
consequences and tensions i.e. differing, conflicting 




stakeholders [23, 24]. A platform provides digital 
resources, such as APIs, that are shared among a large 
set of users. Control over their use is distributed across 
multiple stakeholders and contexts [20]. Fluidity of 
resources poses significant tensions for the platform 
providers. For example, tensions can arise from distinct 
perspectives on the standards and quality of service 
that can be generated across the ecosystems or 
negotiating an optimal level of control that the 
platform provider can institute to provide flexibility to 
coordinate autonomous actors across the ecosystem 
[4]. Established platforms are often able to exercise 
significant degrees of control to increase predictability 
of individual behavior and ecosystem trajectories. 
Based on the interactions among their accumulated 
user bases, they can generate an understanding of the 
nature of these interactions and governance 
mechanisms and draw on methods such as pattern 
recognition (e.g., Netflix can recommend content based 
on similar users). Moreover, a platform’s potential 
merit is largely emergent, arising in-vivo since it is 
tightly connected to the user base and interactions in 
the ecosystem. Understanding the types of interactions 
and value that the platform offers to users is 
challenging for emerging platforms with relatively 
small user bases. Not least since prospective platform 
users may generally postpone adoption or only partly 
commit until the value and participation of other users 
is realized [25]. 
Given that a platform’s sociotechnical design is 
prone to evolve over time, and is subject to different 
re-combinations, platforms can draw on distinct 
degrees of architectural leverage in production, 
innovation, and transaction [26]. Production leverage 
describes how platforms enable reuse of core assets 
and, through interfaces, allow sharing of these with 
actors in the ecosystem, thereby enabling economies of 
scale and scope. For example, Apple and Google 
provide the architectural base of APIs that enable 
developers to create applications interoperable across 
wider ecosystems. Innovation leverage also refers to 
the sharing of resources, but for innovative purposes 
through recombination and specialization [27]. 
Innovation leverage arises from digital platforms’ 
capacity to facilitate learning and creativity by 
converting search from distant to local [28]. The search 
for innovative solutions and knowledge resources is 
path dependent as satisfying actors, in general, will 
draw on previous connections, experiences, and 
knowledge i.e. explore options in the "local" domain. 
Such a search is more cost-efficient since it leverages 
the actor's current expertise, routines, cognitive frame 
and absorptive capacity, with the risk of better 
alternatives not being considered [29]. Distant search 
i.e. exploring options further away from the actor's 
own practices and knowledge entail greater search 
costs. Transaction leverage refers to the intermediary 
role platforms play in enabling transactions of various 
kinds by providing infrastructure for interactions and 
exchange, thereby increasing efficiency and reducing 
search costs. In digital platform ecosystems, these 
exchanges are naturally founded on information 
transactions. An example is how Airbnb facilitates 
transactions between users by reducing the search time 
required for lease and rental apartments. 
As digital platforms provide resources that are 
dynamic and a function of human appraisal [30], they 
enable new actors across the ecosystems to engage in 
practices that promotes their interest as they seek to 
create value. As actors may hold different beliefs about 
the platform’s potential value, e.g. due to information 
asymmetries [13], the platform provider is susceptible 
to different and contradictory responses as external 
actors gradually shape an understanding of value-
creating interactions through trial-and-error practices. 
During such learning processes, ecosystem actors are 
likely to discover and engage in practices that deviate 
from current practices, making tensions salient, and 
potentially contradictory by revealing plurality, 
scarcity or hitherto unrecognized changes [4]. Plurality 
in the context of digital ecosystems refers to the 
availability of similar options while scarcity arises 
from competition regarding specific resources. A high 
degree of change in emerging platform ecosystems, 
results in uncertainties regarding economic returns 
from investments and opportunistic behavior. 
Providers are therefore required continuously adapt to 
the needs of actors while dealing with uncertainty in 
the technological trajectories. For emerging platforms, 
due to their relatively smaller influence over resources 
across the ecosystem, these uncertainties can subject 
the platform provider to contradictory practices as they 
seek to alter and re-align themselves with multiple 
identities and practices of actors in the ecosystem [7]. 
To explore how tensions arising from competing 
concerns and shape the evolutionary trajectory, we 
conceptualize digital platforms as an evolving set of 
sociotechnical resources, carrying distinct architectural 
leverage, varying over time, and enabling different 
types of connections among constitutive modules and 
agents. 
 
3. Research Design  
 
We studied Trafiklab, a start-up in the public 
transport industry in Sweden, launched in September 
2011 by a group of Public Transport Operators [PTOs] 
led by Samtrafiken. Trafiklab aims to serve as a hub 




and public transport users. It has an overarching goal 
of facilitating the development of digital services based 
on public transport data. Between 2011–2017, 
approximately 3000 users registered, 2200 services and 
prototype applications were developed. To this end, 
Trafiklab was deemed a suitable study object since it is 
currently in the developing phases of the platform life 
cycle. Semi-structured interviews, internal reports, and 
weblogs were used as data sources. In total, we 
conducted 48 interviews and used 29 internal 
documents and blog posts. Interviews were conducted 
between 2015–2018. The overall duration of the 
interviews was 36 hours, with an average interview 
time of 1 hour 5 minutes. As we were interested in 
exploring concerns and actions dating from Trafiklab’s 
inception, interviewees selected needed to have 
knowledge regarding Trafiklab’s inception and to have 
been involved at decision-making levels that affected 
Trafiklab’s trajectory. 
 
3.1 Data Analysis  
 
Our data analysis was guided by an inductive 
approach, following an initial coding phase, focused 
coding and theoretical coding [31]. First, an initial set 
of interviews were transcribed and openly coded using 
atlas.ti. Open coding involves “attaching a code or 
label that summarizes and accounts for each piece of 
data” [31: 43]. In our case, this involved attaching a 
code to sections of the transcribed interviews or 
document that indicated a concern (e.g. alternatives or 
competing options or dilemmas that confronted 
Trafiklab in advancing the ecosystem) and potential 
actions taken in response. The first round of coding 
was descriptive and broad as we sought to gain an 
empirical understanding of the case while being open 
to exploring our studied phenomenon. Second, in later 
rounds of interviews we investigated further concerns 
and actions that occurred frequently in the data. These 
subsequent interviews explored in detail how specific 
actions taken were related to resolving an identified 
issue. The material was analyzed through “focused 
coding” [31: 57] in which frequently occurring codes 
identified in the initial open coding were used to 
support, synthesize and explain larger segments of 
data. In doing so, we focused on specific actions 
Trafiklab took towards resolving those concerns. To 
ensure we had not missed any relevant aspects, we 
used the initial concerns and actions identified to 
develop a timeframe of actions and concerns with 
which we held further interviews with four data 
providers exploring their views of those concerns. 
Based on further interviews, proposed minor changes 
were made to some concerns we had identified and 
their timing. Based on this, we reworded codes, 
merging some together. For example, codes related to 
standardizing data formats, upgrading APIs, data 
integration etc. were broadly categorized under the 
label “data quality”.  
Thirdly, once we had identified concerns that were 
relevant and for which Trafiklab took actions to 
address, we held further interviews with employees 
who could be knowledgeable about these identified 
concerns. In doing so, we described the concern in 
terms of the successive actions Trafiklab took. For 
example, Trafiklab wanted to advance certain 
technically-related functions of the platform by 
reaching out to users through informal meetings e.g. 
meet-ups or using newsletters. We then explored why 
this was necessary. For example, codes that labeled the 
different ways Trafiklab reached out to users and 
providers through Meet-ups or hackathons, and using 
their support forum, were grouped under the core 
category interactions. Through multiple iterations and 
discussions between the authors, we examined 
relationships between the different core categories, 
exploring trends of the changes through axial coding 
[31]. The outcome is the general process patterns 
described in figure 1, and the details of how this 
process evolved described in the following. 
 
4. Navigating Tensions from Competing 
Concerns  
 
Figure 1 below shows an inductively identified 
iterative process generated from our analysis in which 
the platform provider sought to navigate competing 
concerns and associated tensions in the establishment 
of an ecosystem. The process logic in the model is such 
that emergent practices among distributed actors result 
in tensions i.e. new inconsistencies are generated, or 
become salient, contradictory or disabling [4]. 
Tensions trigger a new platform configuration (i.e. 
sociotechnical structures constituted by the platform 
core, complementary resources, and couplings to 
modules and actors in the ecosystem) to materialize. 
The new platform configuration induces a value logic 
(i.e. specific composition of architectural leverage i.e. 
production, innovation and transaction [26]) guides 
interactions i.e. exchange of various kinds between 
actors in value creation processes based on information 
transactions and exposure to diverse resources. For 
Trafiklab, we found this pattern to repeat in multiple 
cycles described in phases 1-4. Below, we describe 
phases characterized by the identified tensions that 
triggered these dynamics, and how the platform 








Figure 1. Platform dynamics 
 
 
4.1. Phase 1: Internal vs. External service 
development 
 
The launch of Trafiklab in September 2011 was 
ignited by a practical concern: the failure of major 
PTOs to adjust daily operational routines and services 
(e.g. customer support, communications, delivery of 
services) swiftly to changes brought about by the use 
of smartphones. Third-party developers resorted to 
scraping data from PTOs websites, in order to develop 
smartphone applications for users of public transport. 
Samtrafiken, a joint venture aimed at coordinating and 
strengthening public transport services owned by 38 
PTOs, made initial efforts to adapt so that it could 
coordinate service development with third-party 
developers. This was unsuccessful as developers felt 
that Samtrafiken’s desire to retain control restricted 
them, resulting in low take-up of these alternatives and 
a continued preference to scrape the PTO data. The 
PTOs were left with the options of either making 
improvements to their existing services or shutting 
down third-party services entirely. Shutting down other 
applications based on scraped data was not feasible 
since these were based on publicly available, open 
data. This was a problem for the PTOs since issues 
with these applications, such as incorrect use of 
information or low-quality programming, could result 
in poor or faulty information to public transport users. 
This triggered the need for an alternative that would 
address both the developers’ concerns and those of the 
PTOs. As the manager of Trafiklab explained: 
“If we did not develop this platform, third-party 
developers would still build applications using our 
data. We wanted to offer a structured process where 
developers could develop services that would not 
conflict with our own services, because we had initially 
experienced problems when developers-built services 
using scraped data.” [Trafiklab Manager] 
Instituting new sociotechnical design changes: 
Settling for the option to steer developers away from 
scraped data to an alternative service development 
model resulted in the creation of Trafiklab, a platform 
to coordinate the activities of third-party developers 
and PTOs. The initiative involved the development of a 
transformation layer: an architectural layer for data 
filtering and standardization that provided a shared 
resource for future actors joining Trafiklab. For 
Trafiklab, the architectural layer acted as an incentive 
to entice data providers to the platform, since APIs 
could be tested and exposed to third parties without 
them incurring the full cost of developing a proprietary 
layer. The transformation layer provided potential 
developers an alternative to scraped data as it offered a 
filter function that transformed and generated multiple 
data formats. The purpose was to provide an agile 
environment for developers, reducing the time and cost 
involved in accessing data. The idea was to align 
Trafiklab with the developers’ “culture”, distinguishing 
it from bureaucratic public transport, and to provide a 
better option than scraping data from different PTOs. 
As the manager explained: 
“In the beginning, we use the transformation layer 
to develop APIs that were more suitable for developers 
to create services rather than data scraping.” 
[Trafiklab Manager] 
Incentivizing participation to enable value 
exploration: As Trafiklab attracted developers and 
data providers, it built on these initial users to further 
consolidate its user base through different incentives. 
For example, prizes were awarded to developers 
participating in innovation competitions. Through 
travel hacks, specific tasks were assigned to developers 
to explore possible services. For example, an App 
Contest to create apps for disabled travelers focused on 
addressing the needs of the deaf and blind travelers. 
Trafiklab partnered with other institutions in 
organizing travel hacks. This served as a way to attract 
developers and data providers, and, inform 
stakeholders of the potential value in public transport 
data. As explained by the manager: 
“We have arranged travel hacks together with 
other institutions.….as a way to attract developers to 
look at new kinds of services…and to keep 
stakeholders informed of our work” [Trafiklab 
Manager] 
Stimulating interactions between data providers 
and developers: To address user needs better and 
encourage enrollment on the platform, Trafiklab 
facilitated open interactions between data providers 
and developers aimed at knowledge-sharing among the 
initial users. Besides using its support forum, the 
Trafiklab Meet-ups were particularly valuable for 
engaging with users. Thus, a network of developers 
and data providers could share experiences and ideas 
on using Trafiklab at workshops and physical 
meetings. An added advantage of meet-ups was that 
developers interacted directly with data providers.  
 
4.2. Phase 2: Stability vs. Adaptability of 





As Trafiklab grew over time, it became apparent 
that the initial set of resources e.g. APIs available on 
its platform significantly limited the developers. This 
realization was largely related to the recognition that 
most application prototypes did not result in large-scale 
services and could not easily adapt to frequent changes 
associated with APIs. To remain relevant in the 
ecosystem, Trafiklab needed to move beyond the mere 
publication of data and, demonstrate the potential 
value, which they reckoned could further expand the 
user base and scope of the ecosystem.  
“To make the ecosystem around Trafiklab grow, it 
was not enough to make an app prototype... We wanted 
professional apps … Initially, we focused on providing 
APIs for third-parties…But this limited the options that 
developers could use the APIs for.” [Business 
Strategist] 
Adopting new sociotechnical resources to scale 
services: Realizing that it needed to expand its user 
base and scale of services, Trafiklab made a concerted 
effort to develop APIs with functionalities and formats 
interoperable with other data formats used across 
developer communities. There was a recognition that, 
despite the strength inherent in the position as a 
national hub, Samtrafiken and Trafiklab could not, and 
would not, benefit from imposing their own technical 
practices. Thus, Samtrafiken and Google started a 
collaboration to provide data through APIs supporting 
the GTFS (General Transit Feed Specification), a data 
format used by Google Transit for applications within 
public transport. 
“Samtrafiken had a collaboration with Google. We 
provided our data for Google to publish. We launched 
GTFS files, the global standard format for public 
transport data.…it is easy for developers to when using 
our data.” [Trafiklab Manager] 
Leveraging ecosystem relationships to support 
value creation: As Trafiklab shifted from providing 
access to data to developing APIs for data formats 
interoperable with other formats used across 
developers' communities, the existing relationships 
with data providers became an increasingly valuable 
resource that they provided developers with. Trafiklab 
initiated a first line of support, which involved support 
for third-party developers in response to questions e.g. 
updates related to an API that required a swift 
response. Given Trafiklab’s knowledge about the 
personnel working in the different PTOs, it leveraged 
this position to forward inquiries swiftly to appropriate 
people with specialized knowledge about the problems 
raised, in case Trafiklab did not have the competency 
to provide a definite answer to the developer. In doing 
so, Trafiklab simplified things for developers and 
further strengthened its position as a more agile 
environment responding to developers’ needs.  
 Leaning interactions towards future changes: 
Given that changes in data format could, in some cases, 
be planned but in others be unforeseen as services 
scaled across other data formats, Trafiklab provided a 
roadmap to developers of possible directions that 
future services and APIs might take. Trafiklab 
communicated APIs updates to specific affected 
developers through newsletters. Although these 
changes could be communicated in the developer’s 
forum, some cases involved data providers who did not 
use the support forum. Overall, these measures aimed 
to provide a sense of direction for developers and 
ensure interoperability of services across different data 
formats. 
“...we keep developers updated of specific changes 
on APIs that will affect their work” [IT support staff] 
 
4.3. Phase 3: Quality vs. Quantity of services 
developed  
 
As Trafiklab attracted more developers and 
increased the number of different data formats for the 
development of services, it witnessed the challenge of 
controlling and ensuring the quality and variety of 
services. This concern affected both data providers and 
Trafiklab. For Trafiklab, this could jeopardize the 
relationship it had with providers as they could be wary 
that their data was being published wrongly or used by 
developers in unacceptable ways, which could cause 
problems for public transport users.  
“The main risks we are facing is that customers are 
using services we cannot control and if these services 
are shut down, or not updated, it becomes tricky for us 
to take care of all customers dependent on the service. 
[PTOs] might think we are the cause” [Trafiklab 
Manager] 
Matching sociotechnical resources with service 
standards: To ensure the output of services was of 
better quality and of an acceptable standard, developers 
had to sign agreements before they could start working 
on the APIs. In this way, Trafiklab could shut down 
applications considered inappropriate according to the 
standards, an action they rarely undertook, as 
developers could resort to scraping data as these data 
were publicly available. Samtrafiken’s earlier attempts 
to control third-party development through restrictive 
measures had ended unsuccessfully. A key 
management system with API keys was thus used to 
ensure control and maintain service quality.  
“developers need to sign up for APIs keys and, 
agree on how the data is used. We can shut down 
services that break those terms.” [Head of IT] 
Incentivizing participation and value through 




scale for access by different developers through the 
key management system, a level of access that could 
be extended based on the adoption and usage of the 
applications developed. By instituting a progressive 
scale, Trafiklab saw this as an incentive for developers 
to develop better services or risk being restricted to 
lower levels of requests and APIs access. Such 
incentives were a component in Trafiklab’s continuous 
ambition to move beyond prototype apps and reduce 
load in its backend systems. 
“The bronze level is 10,000 requests/month, the 
silver is 100,000, the gold is 10-12 million… This is an 
incentive for developers to move to the next level and 
for us to control traffic in our backend systems...” [IT 
support]  
Matching interaction and access with output of 
services: Beyond service agreements, control of third 
parties and service quality was also achieved using 
different levels of access to ensure access and service 
quality varied according to the quality of the developed 
applications and the usage of the services developed. 
Different configurations of APIs were embedded as 
part of the key management system. API Keys were 
matched to the projects of developers. This provided 
feedback and monitoring of the output of specific 
projects and usage of an applications. 
 
4.4. Phase 4: Resource efficiency vs. Scaling 
capacity of platform resources 
  
As Trafiklab had attained the initial objective of 
creating an environment for developing services, 
attracting about 3000 users, and having 2200 
developed services, it sought to ensure that its 
ecosystem of developers and data providers was 
sustainable for a long haul both in terms of efficient 
utilization of resources and scaling the services 
developed. This was in recognition of the fact that 
developers benefited little financially from the initial 
services developed as they engage largely in hobby 
projects with low capacity to scale. Options were 
considered to enable developers to sell tickets through 
smartphones. Trafiklab’s view was that both 
developers and data providers could be attracted to the 
platform in the long-term through network effects 
triggered by APIs that would enable ticket sales. 
“Developers can’t sell tickets…developers could 
create more services if they can make money from the 
services. The only way they can make money is to 
involve them in new ways of selling tickets.” [Business 
Strategist] 
The decision to enable a monetary base for 
Trafiklab was, however, a concern for PTOs, who 
wanted to keep control over this domain. The idea of 
ticketing was also problematic from Samtrafiken’s 
perspective, given that it required service agreements 
with other stakeholders, a political process requiring 
resources and technical competences. For example, 
systems to handle validation of tickets, and a mandate 
from different PTOs needed to be negotiated. Apart 
from being unsuccessful in realizing the idea of APIs 
with the functionality to handle the sale of tickets, 
Trafiklab faced an unexpected event in its ecosystem. 
SL, a key data provider for Trafiklab’s ecosystem, 
decided to move to a new proprietary platform to 
handle data transformation internally. Data 
transformation had become critical for SL’s core 
business and it needed to ensure control and align the 
system with its organizational needs. 
“SL bought new systems to transform APIs. Instead 
of being a shared resource, the new systems are in 
their control. The transformation layer became critical 
for SL’s core business… [Trafiklab Manager] 
Streamlining sociotechnical resources: The 
decision by SL to move to a proprietary platform 
created profound and unforeseen consequences for 
Trafiklab. The transformation layer had, up until now, 
been one of Trafiklab’s key resources, but maintaining 
it to filter fragmented data and test new APIs became 
costly and its value was questioned as providers 
developed proprietary solutions. Thus, Samtrafiken 
decided to shut down the transformation layer. 
“There were lots of different issues regarding the 
transformation of data. It was costly to maintain given 
the resources we had. So, we shut it down.” [Business 
Strategist] 
Refining self-identity to passively sustain 
ecosystem: The removal of the transformation layer 
resulted in a loss of control for Trafiklab as access to 
APIs of key actors became restricted. It became 
difficult for smaller actors to join Trafiklab. The layer 
was a gateway for transforming data and an entry point 
to the ecosystem for data providers to test and explore 
the benefits of APIs before committing.  
“To have small actors joining Trafiklab now, they 
need to build new API systems. This is an entry 
barrier. Before, they could test APIs by connecting 
their internal APIs systems with the transformation 
layer. Now, they have to build the layer on their own, 
which is costly.” [Trafiklab Manager]  
SL’s departure and the shutdown of the 
transformation layer challenged Trafiklab’s identity. 
To some, Trafiklab was a marketplace, to others a 
brand, a community for developers. Evident was that 
Trafiklab’s role and identity was less clear. 
 “We´ve had lots of question about our work. We 
needed to change. Now, Trafiklab is a brand, a 
marketplace. It’s a community for developers. There 







      Most studies examining competing concerns and 
resulting tensions do so from the vantage point of an 
incumbent platform provider [3, 19]. Described as 
platform leaders, prior literature uniquely positions 
these incumbents as powerful actors in the ecosystem 
through the “bouncer rights” they exercise via control 
of strategic resources [6, 10, 13]. However, how 
providers navigate competing concerns and resulting 
tensions, in emerging platform ecosystems has 
received little attention.  
Based on our analysis of Trafiklab, we propose a 
process model of the dynamics involved in this 
navigation process (see figure 1). The model focuses 
on how (a) tensions from competing concerns or 
inefficiencies in existing/alternative solutions trigger 
materialization of a (b) platform configuration. We 
suggest that a platform configuration (i.e. the 
sociotechnical structures constituted by the platform 
core and its couplings to modules) emerges in response 
to tensions based on perceived inefficiencies, 
appreciation of alternative solutions or divergent 
interests. The platform configuration suggests a value 
logic. (c) The value logic (i.e. specific composition of 
architectural leverage in production, innovation and 
transaction [26] may or may not have been foreseen in 
the design. Types of leverage are not mutually 
exclusive, rather different configurations enable 
different amount and types of the three logics. For 
example, in the Trafiklab case the core value logic 
shifted with the removal of the transformation layer, 
from an emphasis on innovation leverage to a 
transaction-oriented logic. The value logic guides (d) 
interactions among actors in the ecosystem. From the 
emergent practices and adaptive behavior arising 
through interactions and appropriation of the value 
logic, new tensions are triggered. For platform 
providers, it is a salient challenge to understand the 
types of interactions they guide users toward. The 
actors in the ecosystem are gradually shaping an 
understanding of value creating interactions through 
trial and error practices. During the course of such 
learning processes, ecosystem actors are likely to 
engage in practices that trigger new tensions. 
Our study demonstrates that emerging platform 
providers have a relatively low strategic leverage to 
influence the trajectory of a platform and ecosystem. 
Given the need to legitimize and scale activities across 
the ecosystem, emerging platform providers align with 
incumbent actors whose actions expose the platform to 
vulnerabilities. As illustrated by the departure of key 
actors and removal of the transformation layer in our 
case, the emergent nature of order creation in complex 
systems [32] might lead the provider to unassumingly 
implement new configurations (in responses to 
tensions) that alters the architectural leverage and 
questions the platform’s identity. These findings 
suggest that emerging platforms should adopt 
strategies enabling them to diversify their value logic 
and operate across multiple ecosystems rather than 
focusing on one key actor or ecosystem [18]. We 
identified four salient tensions, each characterizing 
different phases in Trafiklab’s trajectory, and 
associated responses driving these dynamics. Below 
we discuss these four tensions, how they shaped 
Trafiklab’s trajectory, and attempts to navigate them. 
Consolidating and coordinating autonomous 
actors: As the value of platforms is partly related to the 
size of the user base, attracting the first actors in the 
ecosystem is a salient challenge. A platform provider 
needs to balance disparate interests so that each 
relevant group finds the value logic compelling enough 
to adopt the platform. The control vs. design options 
tension poses a challenge for platform providers as 
potential users, due to the uncertainty of the new 
platform can be reluctant to embrace it. Trafiklab 
sought to consolidate ecosystem actors by leveraging 
an architectural layer that provided resources aligned 
with developer’s interests, while still providing a sense 
of increased control towards data providers. Trafiklab 
had a relatively weak bargaining position as developers 
could turn back to their data scraping practices if the 
value logic was not attractive enough. Thus, Trafiklab 
largely focused on aligning with developers by e.g. 
simplifying search and access to data, providing 
incentives such as prizes to developers to explore APIs. 
Our study suggests that while access and control 
provides a platform provider leverage to influence 
actors in the ecosystem [6], enabling value-driven 
lock-ins is another potential governance mechanism. 
Trafiklab’s focus on consolidating users by designing 
boundary resources more compelling than the 
scrapping option is an example of such value-driven 
governance. Also, Trafiklab’s boundary resources were 
not restricted to APIs but also included social resources 
to spur interactions among developers. The importance 
of these interactions suggests that social boundary 
resources requires more attention in research.  
Ensuring stability vs. adaptation of platform: In the 
early stages of a platform, the user base provides not 
only resources but also feedback and ideas informing 
discovery of, and decisions on, strategic design options 
[33]. Observing actions and engaging in interactions 
with distinct user groups facilitate discovery. 
Simultaneously, innovation in the larger technological 
environment might generate other attractive options to 
scale the user base. However, an essential tenet in 




maintain a relatively low degree of adaptations of 
interfaces to minimize disturbances for peripheral 
modules. This challenge is not unique to emerging 
platforms but rather applies to all platforms carrying 
non-trivial degrees of digital components that must be 
adapted relatively frequently due to the rapid pace of 
external innovation. However, users of emerging 
platforms are likely to devote less resources to track 
changes in interfaces and adapting their modules. At 
Trafiklab, the response from interactions within and 
across actors provided feedback on potential 
advantages and disadvantages of certain 
configurations. Adaptation to achieve scaling of the 
platform’s services was largely based on the 
developers’ perspective but with the ultimate aim of 
generating end-user services that could scale and prove 
the value of the ecosystem to all actors. To mitigate 
drawbacks of frequent technical adaptation, Trafiklab 
devoted substantial resources to communicate technical 
changes to key actors. In line with prior studies, our 
case suggests that communicating planned changes can 
incentivize developers to update and refine services, 
thus building the user base of a platform [34].  
Managing quality vs. quantity of services 
developed: Digital platforms are valuable because they 
create opportunities to engage distributed actors. 
Striking a balance between quality of the services 
while not overly constraining access and freedom to 
variety, is a key tension that platform providers face. 
For Trafiklab, tracking the quality of services 
generated by users was a key measure to handle this 
tension. The platform resources were configured to 
provide incentives through different degree of access to 
the platform for developers based on the services they 
created. Since the value of Trafiklab’s “bouncer right” 
was still relatively weak, these incentives mainly came 
in terms of carrots rather than sticks.  
Managing resource efficiency vs. Scale capacity: 
While potential platform providers and ecosystem 
actors can initially share a common goal driven by a 
common vulnerability, efficient utilization of resources 
in the long-term to scale a platform as it evolves 
remains challenging. Because of the dependence on 
key actors for resource provision, platform providers in 
emerging ecosystems might be attracted, to resolve this 
tension by adapting socio-technical resources in ways 
that comprise their interest. In our case, the platform 
provider scaled down sociotechnical resources as key 
actors departed from the ecosystem, resulting in a 
platform reconfiguration that increased the adoption 
cost for other actors to join the ecosystem. The 
outcome was a shift of the value logic from an 
emphasis on innovation through shared resource 
integration, to a transaction-oriented logic where 
facilitation of knowledge exchange became dominant. 
This had implications on the platform’s ability to 
actively govern the ecosystem not only because it 
effectively hindered supply-side growth of the 
ecosystem, but also came to challenge the platform’s 
identity. Because the identity and use patterns in early 
phases of a technology is highly open for interpretation 
by users [35], relatively minor changes in design might 
have significant impact on their trajectory. 
 
6. Conclusion and Future Work  
 
Our research at Trafiklab shows that a platform’s 
configuration has significant implication for the value 
logic presented to prospective users, the interactions 
facilitated and the distribution of value in the 
ecosystem. Platforms that have not reached a critical 
mass of users remain weak, as the costs associated with 
losing access to the ecosystem for actors that choose to 
fully or partly abandon the platform are relatively low. 
The weak bargaining power suggests that emerging 
platforms become vulnerable in regard to tensions 
perceived by key users, which might result in these 
users changing their relationships with, and the use of, 
the platform. The dependency on key users might also 
lead platform providers to redesign a platform in ways 
not aligned with their long-term strategy. When 
evaluating such options, providers need to consider 
how changes in platform configurations can lead to 
significant change patterns. Our study is situated in the 
domain of public/private collaborations, focusing on a 
platform engaged in the provision of open APIs and 
public data. Thus, regulations and competing concerns 
might be particularly salient in this context. The 
importance of these contextual specifics requires 
further attention. 
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